ABSTRACT In current software environments, code injection attacks have been better defended. But it also forced attackers to use the code already exist in memory to construct code-reuse attack, making code-reuse attack become the focal point of the new round of offensive and defensive games. As an important defense against attacks based on address space layout, code randomization technology effectively defends code-reuse attack by randomizing memory address space. The ASLR proposed by the Pax team is now used by most operating systems. However, due to memory disclosure, the security premise of code randomization has been broken. Therefore, in order to effectively defend against code-reuse attack, the current code randomization technology needs to improve the ability to resist memory disclosure. This paper mainly discusses the current randomization scheme in the context of memory disclosure and summarizes the future development direction of current code randomization technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although under the protection of different dimensions such as hardware, operating system and software, the traditional code injection attacks have been better defended, but attackers can still use the existing code fragments in the memory space to construct Turing completeness code-reuse attack [1] . This code-reuse attack, which does not require injection of executable exploit code, can effectively bypass some new security mechanisms and play a key role in exploiting vulnerabilities. From the cases published and disclosed in recent years, code-reuse attack technology has become the main way to control the use of stream hijacking.
In the past ten years, academic and industrial circles have conducted extensive and in-depth research on binary code reuse, and proposed many relatively complete solutions to defense code-reuse attack. These methods are mainly divided into two categories, namely, protection based on control flow integrity, and protection based on code randomization. And the ASLR [2] proposed by the Pax team is now used by most
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. operating systems. However, whether it is a coarse-grained or fine-grained code randomization method, most of the randomization operations are performed once, and the memory layout is no longer changed. However, the existence of memory disclosure vulnerabilities breaks the security premise of code randomization-that is, the code randomization protection method makes the attacker unable to detect and understand the assumption of memory information. The memory disclosure vulnerability allows an attacker to snoop on the program's memory layout and launch a code-reuse attack. Therefore, a defense, which performs a randomization operation only before the program runs, becomes vulnerable to memory disclosure. There is an urgent need to improve the code randomization method against memory disclosure.
In recent years, researchers have proposed some defensive measures to prevent program memory disclosure, including coarse-grained and fine-grained randomization and runtime randomization schemes. Among them, runtime randomization provides a better defense against memory disclosure. The main idea is that the rerandomization of the program invalidates the a priori knowledge obtained by the attacker through the memory layout information leakage, and thus attackers cannot effectively construct the attack. This article focuses on code randomization to combat memory disclosure, and the analysis of randomization methods in operation.
This paper analyzes the code randomization scheme under the disclosure of memory information from two aspects: (1) the basic defense of code-reuse attack, and the principle and method of memory disclosure; (2) Research and comparison of randomization schemes, and further explore the key functions and available technologies of the runtime randomization technology. Through the analysis on the randomization method in the existing operation, the shortcomings are pointed out and the possible development directions are explored.
II. CODE-REUSE ATTACK AND MEMORY DISCLOSURE
Data Execution protection (DEP), one of the few successful defense strategies, has caused great difficulties in injecting malicious code attacks into code in the early stage of attack-defense game. However, in this case, attackers quickly shifts from injecting malicious code to reuse-code attacks such as Return-to-libc [3] or Return Oriented Programming (ROP) [1] . An effective defense against code-reuse attack depends on randomization. For example, extensive address space layout randomization (ASLR) technology randomizes base addresses of various storage areas. However, attackers can often exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to expose code layout and implement code-reuse attack. A series of coarse-grained and fine-grained randomization schemes are invalidated. And with the development of a new round of attack-defense game brought by code-reuse attack, the attack mode and defense means of code-reuse attack are all developing forward.
A. CODE-REUSE ATTACK AND ITS DEFENSE
An attacker who implement code-reuse attack means does not need to inject attack code, but constructs attack through existing code in the target memory address space. In this attack mode, an attacker exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability to overwrite the return address as the address of specific instruction fragments called gadget. And these gadgets end with ret instruction. With ret instruction, attackers can execute multiple gadgets in series and achieve the purpose of attack. And this attack means has been proved to be Turing completeness [1] , so it has extremely powerful functions and will cause great harm. It is precisely because of this that code-reuse attack become the focus of attack-defense game.
Judging from the current research, the development of code-reuse attack can be basically divided into three phases. The first-stage based on function-level code reuse with Return-to-Libc [3] as the core, in which attackers use the buffer overflow vulnerability to call the library function to attack. On the second stage, the core of code-reuses attack is Return oriented programming (ROP) [1] . ROP constitutes an attack by linking a series of small code fragment called a gadget. It is a very effective attack technology. Since its introduction in 2007, the ROP attack has actually laid the foundation for the development of code-reuse attack. The third-stage code-reuse attack is a code-reuse attack against randomization in interactive environment represented by JIT-code reuse [4] and COOP (Counterfeit Object-Oriented Programming) [5] . But the attack on code reuse has never deviated from the ROP-based link gadgets attack mode.
Therefore, the two preconditions for successful doing code-reuse attack are unchanged: (1) there are enough gadgets available in memory to fulfill functional requirements, and new functional control flows can be dynamically introduced by controlling flow transfer and control flow transfer or holding between the gadgets; (2) gadgets can be accurately positioned to the required gadgets during the running of the program. That is, you need to know the memory address of the gadget during the running of the program, which will be used as the jump target of the control flow. According to the two preconditions for code-reuse attack, the current ideas and methods for protecting code-reuse attack are shown in Figure 1 . On the one hand, to prevent unexpected control flow jumps, a control flow integrity enforcement system is constructed; on the other hand, to reduce the attacker's knowledge of memory layout and a randomization strategy is introduced. Next, this paper will give a brief analysis of these two protective ideas.
1) CONTROL FLOW INTEGRITY
By restricting the control flow transfer when the program is running, all control flow transfer of the program is in the predefined expected control flow graph (CFG), ensuring the normal execution of the program to defend against code-reuse attack [6] - [8] . In the early research on control flow integrity, in order to provide better defense, CFI checks the target address of each control flow transfer to ensure that all jumps are maintained in the legal set, but it causes extreme high overhead and it causes a serious impact on the system. Subsequent research is focused on the practical coarse-grained control flow complete [7] , [8] scheme. But inevitably, the safety of coarse-grained CFI has declined [9] , [10] compare to fine-grained CFI. And Goktas proved the inefficiency of coarse-grained CFI in 2014, because attackers can still bypass these coarse-grained CFI to build effective attacks [9] . On the other hand, the accuracy of CFI is closely related to CFG, and it is very difficult to obtain a completely accurate CFG. However, the industry has implemented the security mechanisms CFG and CET based on the study of control flow integrity, trying to build a complete ecosystem from the program to the VOLUME 7, 2019 operating environment to combat code-reuse attack. In addition to controlling flow integrity, the researchers have proposed other defenses that can prevent code-reuse attack. For example, Data Flow Integrity (DFI) [12] forces runtime data flows to follow data flow graphs to prevent many memory vulnerabilities from being exploited. Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) [13] separates sensitive data (such as code pointers and pointers to code pointers) from regular data to protect them from unauthorized modifications. And these defenses are not the focus of our state, so they will not be repeated next.
2) THE METHOD OF CODE RANDOMIZATION
Is based on reducing the attacker's knowledge of the memory information to make the code reuse and other attack methods invalid which these attacks rely on the memory layout. The earliest code randomization technique is the address space layout randomization [2] (ASLR) proposed by PaX Team in 2001. ASLR randomly determines the base address and module base address of the program when the application is started and reloaded. The base address of the heap and the stack makes the instructions in the module loaded into the memory and the data address on the stack unpredictable, making the code-reuse attack ineffective or causing more difficulty to attackers. ASLR is widely adopted by most current operating systems, including Linux, Windows 7/8/10, iOS, Android (>4.0) and so on. Since the randomized granularity of ASLR is at the module level, once an address in the module is leaked, the fixed offset of the address can further derive the memory layout. Therefore, the two problems faced by the code randomization method are to increase the randomization entropy and improve the ability of the randomization method to resist memory disclosure. This part will be elaborated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
B. MEMORY DISCLOSURE
As mentioned earlier, the code-reuse attack defense method based on code randomization can effectively defend against code-reuse attack at first, but the appearance of memory disclosure vulnerabilities makes the randomization method no longer as effective as the researchers expected. This is because the security premise of code randomization technology is that it assumes the confidentiality of memory address, that is, the attacker does not know the randomized memory address, so the attacker cannot construct attack that needs to use memory address. However, in the face of memory disclosure, the security assumptions of code randomization technology are challenged. More seriously, memory exposure vulnerabilities are becoming more and more common. As shown in Figure 2 , the number of memory exposure vulnerabilities is increasing. In 2014, more than 2,000 memory exposure vulnerabilities were discovered. According to the way of memory disclosure, it can be divided into direct memory disclosure and indirect memory disclosure. 
1) DIRECT MEMORY DISCLOSURE
Just as Haogang Chen et al. [14] analyzed that direct memory disclosure mainly exploits vulnerabilities such as uninitialized data, integer overflow, buffer overflow and lack of pointer checking, then the program directly outputs and feeds back memory information to the attacker, who can read code pointers directly from the code page, and these pointers are usually embedded in direct branch instructions, such as calls and direct jumps. And because such vulnerabilities can be exploited repeatedly, a large amount of memory information can be leaked. As shown in Figure 3 , page1 read by an attacker through vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow and disassemble it can identify Page2 and Page3 and locate gadgets to constitute code-reuse attack. For example, [4] , [16] is also a direct memory disclosure that bypasses ASLR and fine-grained randomization schemes.
2) INDIRECT MEMORY DISCLOSURE
It refers to leaking code addresses from the stack or heap during program execution, or leaking memory information based on analysis of time and error. As shown in figure 3 , in the case of indirect memory disclosure, the attack can be successfully implemented without no additional memory exposure vulnerabilities [17] , and even if the source code or binary code of the attacked program is ignorant. For example, it can be inferred [18] , [19] , from remote leaks what code exists in a given memory location. Based on the way of indirect disclosure, a large amount of memory information will be leaked, and the location where the information is leaked is not limited to the vulnerability. For example, stack reading attacks, where an attacker guesses memory content by injecting well-constructed data, and then observes whether a process crashes to indirectly leak memory content. They perform partial coverage of the return address on the stack, guessing only one byte of the return address at a time, thus reducing the number of expected guesses. On 64-bit Linux systems, the guess complexity is reduced from 2 64 to 8 * 2 8 . This piecewise guess is the clone-probing attack in RuntimeASLR [20] , because the working process of the main process fork () has the same memory layout as the main process, so repeated attempts can be made to determine the specific value of each byte.
3) PROTECTION METHODS TO PREVENT MEMORY DISCLOSURE
These methods include preventing executable memory from being arbitrarily read or code pointer indirection and encryption, The former prevent read accesses to code pages, so that even if there is a single pointer memory leak in the software, the attacker cannot get the entire code page through the memory disclosure, also the attacker cannot construct effective code-reuse attack. And there are XnR [21] and Readactor [22] in this area. The latter prevent indirect memory disclosure by separating code pointer from code layout. For example, [9] , [13] , [23] uses fast XOR encryption to change pointer representation to prevent indirect disclosure. In addition, runtime randomization technology is also an effective means to deal with memory disclosure, whether it is direct memory disclosure or indirect memory disclosure, and we will give a detailed introduction in the fourth chapter.
III. PRE-RUNTIME RANDOMIZATION
As mentioned earlier, code-reuse attack obtains location information in the virtual address space of the target program to search for a sequence of gadgets that constitute a malicious shellcode. When no randomization method is deployed, the loading location of executable program code segments and address of their shared libraries are fixed or predictable. Therefore, the attacker finds the required gadgets by analyzing the binary files, and then implements the code-reuse attack. Address randomization is a defense based on the defect that the program memory address space is invariant and the main starting point is to introduce uncertainty into the program address space, which improves the difficulty of attack. It is also an effective defense against code-reuse attack. Due to the influence of memory disclosure, the two periods of randomization are mainly divided into pre-runtime randomization technology and runtime randomization technology. Pre-runtime randomization methods can be divided into coarse-grained randomization and fine-grained randomization according to the different random elements. Coarse-grained randomization only randomly selects the base address of the segment, while fine-grained randomization further randomizes the elements in the segment (such as functions, basic blocks, instructions), but the common point of them is that the program will be randomized only once before it runs.
A. COARSE-GRAINED RANDOMIZATION METHOD
PaX team first proposed and implemented address space layout randomization technology (ASLR) [2] . When the application compilers or loads, ASLR mechanism will randomly determine the base address of the program load with a certain entropy for the application. Then the base address of the heap and stack also instruction in module cannot be predicted. But because the randomized granularity of ASLR is at module level, once an address in the module is leaked, the base address of the current module can be calculated by the fixed offset of the address, and then the actual address of instruction in module or data on stack can be calculated, which makes ASLR face the risk of single pointer leakage.
On the other hand, for the purpose of performance optimization, the base addresses of the same module in different processes are the same in some systems. For example, the application process on Android comes from Zyogte process fork(), which makes the base address of libc and many other system libraries the same. An attacker can leak address information and then carry out code-reuse attack through clone-probing attack. That is, by means of violent attempt to realize address speculation, to know the base address of the module, and then to implement code-reuse attack, as mentioned in RuntimeASLR [20] . Therefore, with the help of memory information disclosure vulnerability, ASLR can be easily bypassed, which weakens its ability to protect against code-reuse attack.
B. FINE-GRAINED RANDOMIZATION METHOD
Based on the above factors, since 2012, research on code-reuse attack defense has turned to how to protect against code-reuse attack by implementing fine-grained instruction randomization and eliminating instruction information disclosure. ILR, Binary Stirring, Smashing the gadgets [24] - [26] and other studies by reordering function order, instruction order, and replacing equivalent instructions or reallocating registers and so on to reduce the attacker's knowledge of the program's runtime memory and increase the difficulty of attacks. However, as Snow et al. proposed in Just-in-time Code Reuse, the method of dynamically generating ROP-gadget chains effectively bypasses the above fine-grained randomization. Due to the utilization of various memory disclosure, the memory layout is further exposed to the attacker, and the defense of the fine-grained randomization scheme against code-reuse attack is not as expected. However, due to the high cost of fine-grained randomization schemes, there are still fine-grained randomization research to reduce the cost of randomization and promote actual deployment. For example, [27] promotes rapid and powerful code diversification of clients by expanding binary files with transformation assistant metadata, and promotes the actual deployment of randomization.
IV. RUNTIME RERANDOMIZATION
Because fine-grained randomization methods are still unable to resist the threat of memory disclosure, researchers began to seek runtime randomization technology to defend against code-reuse attack. This is because memory disclosure break the security precondition of the pre-runtime randomized defense--the attacker does not understand the distribution of code in memory. Runtime rerandomization provides an effective defense against code-reuse attack which under memory disclosure. The solution is to invalidate the exposed memory information by rerandomizing the code before the attacker has a chance to use the acquired memory information. Compared to only randomize the program once when the program is compiled, linked or loaded and then randomized address space layout will no longer change, runtime rerandomized continues the randomization operation during the running of the program. As shown in Figure 4 , the effective implementation of rerandomization in operation consists of two steps, one is the trigger strategy of rerandomization, the other is the strategy of rerandomization operation. So, the next two sections introduce these two aspects.
A. TRIGGER CONDITIONS OF RERANDOMIZATION
So far, according to the randomized trigger conditions, the trigger of runtime rerandomization is mainly divided into two categories: Clock timing-based rerandomization and risk-triggered rerandomization. Also, some systems in the purpose of performance optimization, have the same base address of the same module in different processes, such as creating a child process through fork(). So some rerandomization research make fork() as the trigger condition. It is undeniable that fork() is also a risk operation for memory disclosure, and fork()-triggered randomization is risk-based rerandomization, but we will introduce it separately in this article. Next, we will mainly discuss these options in two sections.
1) CLOCK TIMING-BASED RERANDOMIZATION
One trigger condition of rerandomization is clock timingbased rerandomization, that is, a rerandomization operation is triggered every fixed time. The randomized operation invalidates the leaked code information, so attackers needs to collect the memory information again to implement the attack.
Giuffrida et al. first proposed and gave a concrete implementation of runtime randomization -OSASR [28] . And based on the OSASR scheme., there are many studies about runtime rerandomization. For example, STABI-LIZER [29] dynamically rerandomizes the placement of functions, stack frames and heap objects every 500 milliseconds at a per-function granularity during execution, allowing researchers and software developers to effectively evaluate the optimization or measure overhead by sample memory configuration space that have been randomized. Shuffler [30] performs randomization by asynchronously, taking advantage of the spare CPU cycles on the idle core, without modifying any compilers or kernels, and without accessing the source code, using only the existing compiler flags to preserve symbols and relocations. At the same time, the experiment verified that the method only took 0.3% of the time to migrate between code copies. Shuffler can randomize the SPEC CPU with a 14.9% overhead every 50 milliseconds. And the method can randomize applications including MySQL, SQLite, Mozilla's Spider Monkey and Nginx.
Although the randomization method based on fixed-time triggered provides a more effective means against code-reuse attack under memory disclosure, the above-mentioned method exposes two shortcomings of the clock timing-based rerandomization scheme: first, if the time interval is small, the program will frequently trigger the running randomization, which will introduce a large additional overhead and affect the normal operation of the program; secondly, if the time interval is large, the attacker can use the interval to carry out the attack, and the security of the program cannot be guaranteed. For example, although OSASR can trigger a randomization operation every second at the earliest. However, experimental data shows that the extra cost introduced by this method reaches 50%. Only when the interval between two randomizations reaches 20 seconds or more, the introduced overhead is small enough to be ignored. However, the JIT-ROP attack [4] shows that the entire attack can be completed in as little as 2.3 seconds, so a longer interval does not guarantee the security of the program. This is also mentioned in many literatures for time-triggered code randomization. For example, Davi et al. in Isomeron [31] mentioned that ''opponents can exploit the (small) time interval between subsequent randomizations to launch an attack'', Backes et al. [21] noted that ''an attacker may abuse this time window to perform a JIT-ROP attack.'' Therefore, although there are many random operations about clock timing-based rerandomization, these strategies are still in the research stage and cannot be used in practical applications.
2) RISK-TRIGGERED RERANDOMIZATION
Another effective trigger strategy for runtime randomization is risk-based on-demand runtime randomization, which can be applied multiple times in time according to the corresponding randomized trigger conditions for an indeterminate period of time. By this way, the rerandomization is directly related to risky operations that may cause memory disclosure. Timeliness is introduced into code rerandomization, and the effectiveness of implementation of rerandomization is enhanced under the condition of minimizing operational overhead. Therefore, an important issue in the risk-based randomization scheme is when to rerandomize the memory layout, it means to determine the valid randomization trigger conditions. Excessive frequent rerandomization can result in unacceptable performance overhead, while lower-frequency rerandomization gives the attacker the opportunity to disclosure memory layout information and perform attacks before re-randomizing the program address space and cause the security of the randomization policy to be weaken or eliminate.
Specifically, for risk-triggered rerandomization, any operation that may cause memory disclosure can be used as a condition to trigger rerandomization. However, it is undeniable that the selection of trigger conditions directly affects the cost and effectiveness of rerandomization. To be exact, the selection of appropriate triggering conditions is an important part of all risk-triggered randomization schemes.
For example, TASR [32] is rerandomized before any read () after one or more write() calls. Reranz [33] refers to TASR trigger condition and is a lightweight virtual machine. It uses auxiliary processes called ''shuffling processes'' to rerandomize dynamic code to mitigate memory disclosure attacks. Unlike other binary rerandomization methods, Reranz does not require expensive and difficult pointer tracking. Instead, it uses dynamic address translation to handle pointer-related jumps. Other risk-triggered code randomization methods include Librando [34] reading and disassembling and randomizing all the code output by each JIT compiler, but Librando only targets JIT code, not static code, so it cannot defend against direct disclosure attacks and slow down the program running speed. BROP [17] proposes to use each program crash as a trigger condition for rerandomization. The fine-grained ASLR in Isomeron [31] only executes once when offline or loaded, but randomizes the execution path each time a function is called. So Isomeron not only randomizes the code layout, but also the execution path of the program. CodeArmor [35] is also a runtime ASLR system. As long as the program executes system calls, it can re-randomize the program at the segment boundary. CodeArmor works entirely at the binary level without debugging symbols, hypervisors, special hardware functions or operating system changes, but requires a custom loader. Morton et al. [23] used a read of the executable address in the module as a rerandomization trigger condition.
And it is worth mentioning that Mixr [36] can customize the rerandomization interval, select custom trigger points and rearrange the boundaries of program instructions, so it provides flexibility that other systems do not have.
In addition, for the purpose of performance optimization, some modules of different processes have the same base address on some systems. For example, on Android, the fork () of Zyogte process creates the application process, which makes the base address of many system libraries the same. Therefore, attackers can implement code-reuse attack by leaking address information through cooperative attacks. BROP [17] proposed the so-called clone-probing attack, which also exposes memory information. Therefore, some researchers trigger the randomization operation by fork (), and re-randomize the sub-process space to prevent this kind of memory disclosure. For example, RuntimeASLR [20] protects the daemon server, which forks multiple sub-processes to respond to user requests. Simply put, whenever fork() operation is executed, Runtime ASLR randomizes the memory layout of the child process to achieve different memory layout of the parent and child processes. Also, Morula [37] rerandomized the sub-processes to alleviate this problem. Oxymoron [38] is designed to prevent the use of random memory corruption tests to attack the process fork (), which hides direct code references embedded in direct calls and jump instructions. Therefore, attackers can no longer identify and disassemble valid code pages based on these references. Crane et al. [39] also randomizes the sub-process space, but it dynamically chooses the target of indirect branches at runtime to reduce the probability of predicting the correct runtime address of ROP gadgets.
Choosing an appropriate rerandomization trigger condition is an important foundation to consider for all risk-triggered randomization strategies. Too frequent randomization can cause heavy system overhead, and the lack of timely randomization triggers gives the attacker the opportunity to use it to successfully implement the attack. On the other hand, the actual randomization operation will also affect the cost and effectiveness of code randomization. For example, the rerandomization of TASR after each request can be costly, as shuffler [30] points out, with a 15-millisecond delay per 0.22 millisecond request. In addition, TASR's judgment of risk is rather rough, which will lead to too broad triggering conditions, and some safe write operations will trigger randomization too, and such operations cannot provide effective information for attackers to construct code-reuse attack. Especially when TASR is deployed to I/O-intensive programs, randomization will introduce more overhead, which will have a greater impact on the normal operation of the program. In addition, Android is an application process fork () from the Zyogte process. As another trigger to rerandomize risky operations at runtime, Android can improve the traditional ASLR and minimize the performance overhead of the actual execution process. However, in general, this randomized triggering scheme based on sub-process space will not reduce the information disclosure of long-running working processes. The leakage problem that affects memory security will still directly or indirectly disclose the memory information of sub-process space to construct valid code-reuse attack.
It is worth noting that Mixr [36] is selective rerandomization that means the trigger condition can be specified by User, Which would improve the security and accuracy for runtime rerandomization. It can be said that risk-based ondemand runtime randomization is the really matter to runtime rerandomization. And what should be focus on is that the real trigger condition should be considered in different environment.
B. RERANDOMIZATION OPERATION METHOD
The selection of rerandomization triggers only determines the frequency and timing of rerandomization. However, in order to protect against code-reuse attack with memory disclosure, we still need to pay attention to how the specific rerandomization operation is implemented. Form the current studies, there are mainly three rerandomization operation strategies: 1) Randomize program execution path; 2) Modify executable binary files; 3) Generate new random variants and replace old by new variants.
1) RANDOMIZE PROGRAM EXECUTION PATH
Some runtime technologies clone executable elements in memory and toggle all call, return and jump instructions between those elements of different diversification during runtime [39] . On these detected instructions, program execution can be switched randomly between executable replicas. For example, Isomeron [31] randomizes the execution path of a program between two application replicas with different structures but the same semantics, Crane et al. [39] dynamically chooses a branch in order to realize the strategy of runtime rerandomization.
But this randomization strategy needs to maintain control over the execution of code, such as Isomeron modifying or converting all control transfer instructions through the dynamic binary detection framework, [39] maintaining address translation of virtual tables to achieve control. And these detection and tracking of execution code introduce inherent performance overhead to the program. Moreover, because of the executable memory cloning, memory usage overhead will increase.
2) MODIFY BINARY FILES TO ACHIEVE RERANDOMIZATION STRATEGY
Other runtime technologies implement rerandomization strategy by modifying binary files and producing new binary files at runtime. For example, chronomorphic [15] uses self-modifying code (SMC) technology to rewrite potentially-vulnerable software binaries to chronomorphic binaries by repeatedly modify instructions and layout binaries in memory at runtime. The chronomorphic binaries generated by this method are executed in the same way as their previous non-chronomorphic variants, so the runtime overhead of the generated binary file is not incurred during normal operation. By the way, only incurred one millisecond overhead to perform over 1000 sequential rewrites to executable memory during a morph operation. So the cost is very small. However, it is undeniable that the biggest problem faced by this method of modifying binary files is that binary files are not so easy to obtain. On the other hand, the system calls that allow modifying binary files are very dangerous. If malicious attackers take advantage of this feature, they will inevitably cause great losses for he could rewrite the code to do whatever he wants.
3) GENERATE NEW RANDOM VARIANTS AND REPLACE OLDER ONE
The core problem that needs to be addressed in this randomization strategy is the analysis and migration of pointers. The implementation of this strategy requires updating all pointers associated with code locations. There is no doubt that incorrect pointer recognition and references can lead to data corruption or program crashes, so there are many studies about pointer updates in rerandomization process. These studies mainly focus on two aspects, one is to carry out detailed and accurate pointer tracking analysis to further implement randomization, and the other is to update pointers with the help of metadata and jump tables.
The main research of the former is TASR [32] , RuntimeASLR [20] , Shuffler [30] . Among them TASR [32] by modifying the GCC compiler to track all pointers and analyze pointer position information, RuntimeASLR [20] and Shuffler [30] recompile the source code to get the initial code pointer. In particular, RuntimeASLR [20] uses dynamic binary instructions to track code pointers. Although it improves the accuracy of tracking, it generates very high overhead. This method generates more than 1000 times the execution time of the application. It can be said that all such research cost high overhead also it is complex to implement these strategies.
In order to reduce the high overhead and the difficulty of pointer tracking, the latter studies achieve points updating with the help of metadata and jump tables. Such as OSASR [28] embeds metadata information into the binary files and makes runtime state introspection and variants migration possible. Remix [11] maintains some metadata to facilitate runtime randomization. These metadata are used to build index descriptions and jump tables for basic blocks and some important instructions (for example, calls), while ReRanz [33] implements pointer updates and implements a rerandomization process by maintaining an address translation table. This method of avoiding pointer tracking greatly reduces the overhead and difficulty of re-randomizing the implementation deployment runtime. Table 1 compares several typical runtime rerandomization strategies. The implementation of rerandomization relies on reliable triggering, but the clock timing-based rerandomization has been proved to be incapable of defensing against code-reuse attack in memory disclosure environment [21] , [31] . So in general, risk-based randomization triggers, selecting appropriate operations that may set system to risk, as a rerandomization trigger condition is a reliable development direction of rerandomization. In addition, considering the specific operation of rerandomization, in the current software environment, to get binary files of the program is extremely challenging, even if the binary file can be obtained through disassembly, so it is difficult to make the modification of binary files as rerandomized operations in real implement.
V. CONCLUSION
At this stage, code-reuse attack cooperates with memory disclosure to achieve effectively attacks. The disclosure of memory information includes both direct memory arbitrary read defects caused by program loopholes, as well as side channel memory information leaks caused by software and hardware design flaws. Therefore, how to effectively prevent the leakage of memory information is an important direction of recent research.
Randomization provides a better defense idea, which is to invalidate the leaked memory information through runtime rerandomization to prevent the attack from implementing attacks. The implementation of rerandomization relies on reliable triggering, and both time-based and risk-based can be used as triggers for randomization. In general, an effective push for randomness is runtime randomization on demand. Apply multiple times during an indeterminate time period, eliminating the predictability associated with pre-runtime randomization schemes, and significantly increasing the randomized entropy value to enhance the ability to resist memory information disclosure. At the same time, rerandomization operation requires safely and quickly replacement to reduce the potential security risks and overhead.
